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Reflections of the nexus between justice and peacebuilding
Padraig McAuliffe
School of Law & Social Justice, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UKAQ1
¶
ABSTRACT
This commentary reflects on eight articles recently published in this
journal as part of a special issue on the nexus between transitional
justice and statebuilding (Volume 10, Issue 3, 2016). It positions the
special issue within an emerging ‘fourth phase’ literature on
transitional justice that draws on critiques of liberal peacebuilding
to urge an expansion of its boundaries to embrace socio-
economic issues. It is argued that the type of analysis found in the
special issue, characterized by in-depth, on-the-ground empirical
analysis of complex domestic politics of material accumulation
and ideological contestation, marks a significant and welcome
advance in a literature which to this point has been largely de-
contextualized, exhortatory and over-reliant on tired binaries of
the ‘international and the local’ or the ‘liberal and legitimate’.
KEYWORDS
Elites; liberal peacebuilding;
peace agreements; political
economy; transitional justice;
socio-economic rights
As one of the first conscious attempts to account for the interactions between two distinct
forms of international intervention, the eight articles recently published in this journal on
‘Mapping the Nexus of Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding’ are significant in taking a
necessary debate further than the prevailing literature in either field has allowed. The sur-
prisingly sparse transitional justice literature that links these two fields has hitherto been
characterized by the plausible but under-theorized assumptions that transitional justice is
a core element of contemporary peacebuilding (Dancy 2012, 397) and that the latter’s
imposition of external legal frameworks and institutional templates represent the ‘founda-
tional’ limitations to the former (Gready and Robins 2014, 340). The contributors to this
issue do not depart from this analysis, but significantly deepen it by rooting it in empirical
analysis of Bosnia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Libya. Here, both
the traditional theoretical assumptions about transitional justice’s relation to peace and
the strands of critique that emerged in relation to them are problematized by the concrete
challenges of post-conflict instability, accumulation and contention. The contributors
attempt, and mostly succeed, in explaining how external blueprints for peace and
justice are seldom realized, how the interventionary practices of external actors privilege
accountability for physical violence or bodily integrity abuses over redress of structural
inequalities, and how the short-term management of violence trumps structural change.
However, while the contributors do not depart from the prevailing assumption that
transitional justice is fundamentally shaped by the liberal principles that underpin peace-
building, they notably complicate this assumption by consistently illustrating that
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domestic politics tends to determine both the extent and success of externally promoted
projects at all points. The special issue makes apparent that the incorporation of socio-
economic forms of transitional justice has been made difficult by the prevailing liberal
impetus of peacebuilders. The contributors cogently urge a revision of approaches in
both fields. Nevertheless, the analysis herein makes apparent the limitations of even the
most thoroughgoing reorientation of transitional justice and peacebuilding theories to
address socio-economic issues and the interests of marginalized communities. What
these contributions make clear (at times, unwittingly) is that the self-evident ability of
state-level leaders, sub-national elites and grassroots actors on the ground to reshape,
modify and subordinate interventions means that the aspirations adopted and the ends
achieved in transitional justice are as much a product of the domestic political
economy as the ideological biases of interveners. While we can lament the fact that transi-
tional justice as heretofore conceived in think tanks, INGOsAQ2
¶
and diplomatic negotiations
leaves little room to address community concerns and structural forms of injustice, the
way in which international interveners envision justice only partly explains the field’s per-
sistently disappointing record in catalysing meaningful societal change. That transitional
justice and peacebuilding respond to a narrow range of concerns, empower a limited
group of people and conduce more to top-down statebuilding than bottom-up develop-
ment cannot be ascribed entirely to the ‘constructed invisibilities’ (Miller 2008) of the
international community—it is also a reflection of how powerful domestic actors or
groups themselves conceive the limits of justice and apportion wealth in a given
society in ways that international interveners have little power to restrain. While Lai
(2016, 362) is correct that ‘complex international intervention can marginalize experiences
of socio-economic justice’, a revised commitment on the part of peacebuilders and transi-
tional justice actors to emphasize socio-economic justice or catalyse change to structural
inequalities would still challenge an existing order that thus far has not permitted such
progress to develop organically, and that is deliberately sustained by endogenous political
forces that benefit from the unequal distribution of power and resources.
The articles in this special issue argue that a better understanding of the nexus between
peacebuilding and transitional justice can be a productive analytical tool, and in the
country-specific studies demonstrate how this can be the case. However, there is a
tension in the pieces between those who ascribe the failures of transitional justice
mostly to the biases and goals of international interveners (Lai 2016 and O’Reilly 2016),
those who firmly commit to emphasizing the multifaceted and often sharp contestation
between international actors and their domestic counterparts (Arnould 2016), and those
who balance a rhetorical dismay at the influence exercised by external transitional
justice and peacebuilding actors with forms of empirical analysis which suggest the
often stark limitations of interventionary influence on domestic structures (Hronešová
2016; Lamont 2016; Obradović-Wochnik 2016AQ3
¶
).
There has been a rapid and welcome shift in what is labelled ‘fourth phase’ transitional
justice discourse (Nesiah 2016, 11) that urges an expansion in its boundaries to embrace
redistributive justice (Laplante 2008) or action to ‘actively reverse the systems and atti-
tudes that discriminate and dehumanize’ across the entire society (Mullen 2015, 477).
At the root of this scholarly turn is an acknowledgement that the forms of transitional
justice traditionally promoted by the international community do not and cannot
respond to the most pressing interests of local communities. Each of these works
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examines how external blueprints are therefore shaped by domestic processes of con-
testation, resistance and compromise. In so doing, the contributions suggest two con-
clusions that may not be fully reconcilable. The first is that transitional justice needs to
escape its liberal blind-spots to respond to the needs of marginalized communities. The
second is that those domestic communities that are not so marginalized and instead
benefit from the extant political economy have both the means and the motivation to
resist any such reorientation. If the nexus between transitional justice and peacebuilding
is to be a useful analytical tool, scholarship needs to move beyond simplistic binaries of
liberal impositionism versus domestic resistance, the international versus the local. This
is not merely, as Arnould notes, because the international and the domestic never consti-
tute distinct analytical levels or separate geographical spaces (Arnould 2016, 325). It is also
because they preclude the sort of fine-grained analysis of the international and domestic
that could inform better policy-making or critique. There is no liberal international mono-
lith—it has long been recognized that liberal statebuilding is often undermined by econ-
omic liberalization (De Soto and del Castillo 1994, 74) and that both activities are practised
by distinctly different actors (Woodward 2013, 148). Nor, indeed, is there an identifiable
local beyond a phantasm that exists only in rote juxtaposition to the international—as
the articles in the special issue make clear, the local mixes the poor, the unemployed
and the marginalized with national and sub-national elites who benefit from the structures
that led to war and followed from it. To usefully analyse transitional justice’s nexus with
peacebuilding means the local needs to be disaggregated into the national, the subna-
tional and the micro-local, all of which have different, and often conflicting, interests.
It is apparent from these articles that progress towards more redistributive justice or
provision of social minima can only follow from inherently conflictive and non-linear pro-
cesses of negotiation and interaction. The contributors urge that more sensitive models of
transitional justice be co-produced internationally and domestically, but the prospects for
success can only be assessed with a historically informed understanding of the loci of
effective political power in a given post-conflict state. Such an understanding would incor-
porate the balance of social divisions after war, the institutions and sites where power is
contested, and the means through which political will is formed and employed. The
articles in this special issue do this in a way that a largely exhortatory transitional justice
literature has failed to do until this point. In so doing, they also highlight the limitations
of approaches that nevertheless concentrate more on the practices and biases of interve-
ners than the full range of agencies and contradictory interests of the intervened-upon.
In reflecting on these issues, this article begins by outlining the reasons for the gap
between the transitional justice and peacebuilding literatures that is identified throughout
the special issue, but not fully explained. It then goes on to examine how domestic politics
serves to reorient and co-opt external blueprints for transitional justice in an environment
characterized by contestation and bargaining between national, sub-national and inter-
national actors. It concludes that to meaningfully comprehend the nexus of peacebuilding
and transitional justice such that it becomes a guide for more economically conscious
justice projects, it is not enough to interrogate the ontological, epistemological and meth-
odological biases of interveners, as most of the fourth phase transitional justice literature
has done. Socio-economically emancipatory visions of justice can never be translated in a
linear fashion into reformed social conditions as purposeful action to this end is inevitably
warped by the domestic obstruction and resistance such activities set in motion.
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Explaining the gap
As Millar and Lecy (2016) demonstrate in their study of citational practices, the literatures
on peacebuilding and transitional justice developed in splendid isolation from each other
with little cross-over or engagement, notwithstanding evident similarities in context of
application, teleology and critique. One point that should be made is that by focusing
on the ‘legal’ (criminal) transitional justice literature and the psychosocial literature in
peacebuilding, the authors do not pinpoint the dominant contemporary intellectual direc-
tions in both fields—transitional justice scholarship and practice has long abandoned a
single-mechanism focus to embrace more holistic bundling of mechanisms, while liberal
peacebuilding scholarship is characterized far more by examining statebuilding and
democratization than restoration of damaged relationships between communities in
divided states. Even bearing this in mind, their ultimate conclusions remain solid—the
research focus of transitional justice is rarely situated in a peacebuilding context, while
a survey of the main texts and journals in the field reveals that peacebuilding largely
ignores transitional justice, and there is scant substantive exchange between the litera-
tures. Though Baker and Obradović-Wochnik (2016, 287) express a sense of puzzlement
that they should have ‘ended up as separate fields rather than distinct but interlinked
topics of inquiry within a unified field’ of post-conflict reconstruction, the distinctive devel-
opment of both disciplines readily explains their parallel evolutions.
That peacebuilders have neglected to engage significantly with transitional justice
should not, on the face of it, be surprising. Peacebuilding, after all, is a much larger and
more multi-faceted process. The meta-project of peacebuilding is statebuilding, a totaliz-
ing enterprise that incorporates most aspects of domestic political and administrative life,
which itself is festooned with a number of other urgent and attention-sapping enterprises
like democratization, rule of law, security sector reform and refugee returns that operate to
restrict the amount of policy or scholarly scrutiny that even something as seemingly
imperative as transitional justice can be afforded. That these projects take priority over
transitional justice should not be attributed to a conscious or unconscious blind-spot on
the part of peacebuilding scholars. They instead reflect the priorities of antagonists
when negotiating an end to conflict. Easterday’s (2014, 388–389) analysis of the UN
peace agreement database reveals that even given the increased emphasis on human
rights in peace accords, the most common substantive issues included are security
arrangements (69 per cent of all peace agreements), rule of law (just over half of all
peace agreements), military issues (just under half of all peace agreements) and statehood,
territory and identity (approximately 40 per cent). Human rights issues, by contrast, were
included in 31 per cent of agreements and transitional justice in merely a fifth of them. The
average specificity of peace provisions is also indicative of what is considered essential and
what is considered marginal. Provisions relating to security issues, power-sharing, elec-
tions and property rights are considerably more exacting and precise in terms of bench-
marks and timetables for implementation than rights issues (Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and
Dawes 2007, 22). This reality underpins the ‘disconnect’ Arnould (2016, 323) describes
between the norm and actual practice of transitional justice, where even those states
that ostensibly commit to pursuing justice adopt policies that contradict or insufficiently
support the norm.
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Though transitional justice scholars express confidence that transitional justice is an
‘essential’ and ‘extensive’ part of the liberal peacebuilding package (Andrieu 2010,
538), this is not borne out by the practice of peacebuilding missions. While it is true to
say that criminal justice was seen by the international community as a key peacebuilding
tool at the time the ad hoc tribunals were established, the self-evident failure of the ICTY
and ICTRAQ4
¶
to deter atrocities in Kosovo or the Great Lakes and the instrumentalization of
their verdicts by ethnic leaders rapidly undermined this faith. The UN-supported Serious
Crimes Process did little to protect East Timor against destabilizing violence, the ICCAQ5
¶
han-
dicapped the search for peace in Uganda and Darfur, and demand for accountability
severely complicated the quest for an end to Colombia’s civil war, complicating emergent
narratives of ‘no peace without justice’. Optimism regarding the ability of truth and recon-
ciliation commissions to ground more responsive forms of peace have given way to a
realization that their predicted potential to catalyse much-needed institutional or struc-
tural reforms is ‘still-born’ because executive commitment to implement their recommen-
dations is frequently lacking (Mani 2005, 518). The failure of peacebuilders to adequately
support truth commissions in terms of resources and political support may amount to an
implicit acknowledgement of what De Greiff (2009, 36) recognizes as the persistent gap
between insight and transformation that characterizes even the best designed of these
mechanisms. Reparations have been justified in instrumental terms as a form of justice
that conduces to stabilizing the transition after conflict (Elster 2010, 17). However, the
evident reality that in most post-conflict states any satisfactory compensation of victims
would deplete the available funding for other victims or other necessary social projects
have called into question the causal contribution reparations can make to peacebuilding,
even as the moral and legal cases for reparation become better articulated (e.g. Kritz 2002,
44; De Greiff 2009, 39). For these reasons, it is difficult to assert that transitional justice is
something the peacebuilding literature should be paying greater attention to. As of early
2017, of the six states listed by the Peacebuilding Commission as priorities (Burundi, Sierra
Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Central African Republic), transitional justice has
seen significant progress only in Sierra Leone’s Special Court and in Liberia’s Truth Com-
mission. Commitments to transitional justice were greater in other peacebuilding missions
in DR Congo and Libya. However, as the articles in this special issue make clear, these were
not strongly supported by peacebuilders. The lack of attention the peacebuilding litera-
ture pays to transitional justice, while regrettable, may ultimately be a reflection of the
latter’s marginality to its core focus. It is worth pointing out that this marginality is some-
thing that practitioners on the ground have long been aware of, even if theory has yet to
take full cognizance of it—to claims in the critical literature that transitional justice is
essentially another example of liberal international imposition, transitional justice actors
practising on the ground respond that they have little or no influence over domestic pri-
orities (Taylor 2013AQ6
¶
, 5).
Given the evident centrality of peacebuilding to the prospects for its success, transi-
tional justice’s failure to engage with peacebuilding may seem more puzzling. It can,
however, be explained by the intellectual development of the field. As Baker and Obrado-
vić-Wochnik (2016, 282 and 283) note, transitional justice exists because institutions and
scholars have constructed them as objects that can be comprehended through a
process of producing not only the understandings of what knowledge is seen as author-
itative, but which goals are seen as imperative. In an extremely short period of time the
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field has raced from debates over whether or not to punish to controversies like the peace
versus justice and justice versus truth debates, to ultimately arrive at a general commit-
ment to holistic blendings of mechanisms. All debates in its advocacy-cum-policy-oriented
literature implicitly or explicitly relate to the field’s self-identity. This identity has become
contested, the locus of those ‘struggles over meanings, hierarchies and resources’, Baker
and Obradović-Wochnik (2016, 285) observe. A broad interdisciplinary space emerged
spanning academic arenas as disparate as anthropology, development studies, economics,
gender studies, history, psychology and theology, among others. In ‘fourth phase’ transi-
tional justice, these new transdisciplinary mindsets expand the discursive boundaries of
who and what the field is for, and so elaborate competing visions of justice. The field’s
increasing symbolic capital leads to ever-greater pressure to ‘reframe’ the field to
include the broader agendas like socio-economic justice, the everyday and women’s
rights (Bell 2009, 13). Transitional justice is therefore a site of purposive struggle where
‘issues are framed so as to resonate with already accepted norms, attract funding, conso-
lidate partnerships and networks, and encourage action’ (Gready and Robins 2014, 355).
It is submitted that this constant metaconflict over transitional justice’s direction,
aspirations and conceptualization has meant that the focus of transitional justice has
remained more on the field’s own knowledge-making practices than the actual field of
application. The vigorously contested process of expanding the interdisciplinary spaces
within transitional justice (and hence its ultimate goals) has taken precedence over
study of actual post-conflict ecologies. The essential element in this reframing process is
a firm constructivist conviction that inter-subjectively constructed norms shared among
pertinent political or economic agents in transition can be a decisive causal factor in influ-
encing outcomes. Constructivism is generally comprehended in contradistinction to realist
and/or rational choice-based attitudes that present how material constraints, vested inter-
ests and strategic calculations impinge on political, economic and social resources as the
key factors determining the impact of norms. Constructivists, by contrast, adopt the view
that while their normative and ideological frameworks do not absolutely determine action
in causal terms, collective cultural, normative and ideological understandings can strongly
influence the interpretation of context and constraints (Autesserre 2011, 156). Conse-
quently, the belief O’Reilly (2016, 421–422) expresses that transition from war to peace
is a ‘window of opportunity’ to unsettle existing hierarchies and norms is one that is
shared throughout a literature characterized by an under-analysed assumption that tran-
sition amounts to a transformative constitutional moment where the distribution of
poverty and wealth, land reform and the economy may be publicly addressed (Bergsmo
et al. 2010, 2). It is assumed that states should feel a greater compulsion to redress con-
ditions of socio-economic deprivation in the transitional period, especially if they are pre-
sented as rights violations, and that it is the task of transitional justice to capitalize on the
opportunity (Laplante 2008, 331, 341). On the basis of such an assumption, behavioural
norms may define the policy options open to international and domestic actors more
than the actual economic, political and social contexts they intend to affect. As a result,
material interests are subordinated to the value that affected populations put on both
the process and outcome of change, and lose the causal agency they enjoy in more
realist accounts (Chandler 2007, 709).
A concentration on post-conflict ecology would have compelled greater attention to
peacebuilding if the intellectual history and developmental trajectory of transitional
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justice were different. However, as it stands, what little attention peacebuilding is given
consists of a relatively superficial appropriation/repetition of the core elements of the
liberal peacebuilding critique without much engagement with the actual field of appli-
cation on-the-ground. This in itself should not be surprising, as constructivists tend to dis-
regard the potential limitations of humanitarian action—failure is instead attributed to
collective lack of will on the part of the international community (Coyne 2013, 14–15).
As a result, scholars have generally assumed that transitional justice has been captured
by liberal peacebuilding, and that this explains the historic privileging of bodily integrity
abuses over structural inequality. Franzki and Olarte (2013, 204–207), for example, argue
that liberal peacebuilding not only circumscribes the ambition of transitional justice in
defining democracy as a certain state of social relationships in the political sphere, it
also legitimizes it as such. Sharp (2013), similarly, argues that transitional justice is so
entangled in liberal peacebuilding’s imperatives towards democracy and the market
economy that the issues of social justice that are caused by conflict, and flow from it,
go unnoticed.
Lai (2016, 363) is correct to note that transitional justice could benefit from the critical
peacebuilding literature’s focus on the exclusions and power relations embedded in inter-
national intervention. However, if the aspiration for the nexus of transitional justice with
peacebuilding to become a useful analytical tool is to be realized, it needs to go
beyond the mere appropriation of critical peacebuilding. A critique has emerged of
those critical peace studies that place the West and the liberal at the centre of analysis,
juxtaposing them against the domestic ‘rest’ (Peterson 2012, 18). Though this literature
is replete with references to hybridity, localized needs and everyday existence, much
liberal peacebuilding critique omits to ‘represent or engage with the activities or behav-
iour of particular peoples targeted by interventions, since these were… implicitly irrele-
vant to the conclusions that the research wanted to draw about the West’s relationship
with post-conflict environments’ (Sabaratnam 2013, 263). Even forceful critics of liberal
peacebuilding have started to question whether contemporary critical peace studies
can ever yield a functional way forward to an improved praxis on the ground beyond
simply deconstructing liberal interventionism (Newman 2011, 1747). In the special issue,
Martin (2016, 403) conveys a sense of this when she argues that ‘the critical peacebuilding
literature has become too focused on questions regarding the potential manifestations of
resistance and hybridity, who is appropriating what, where the everyday and local exist,
and in what ways liberal peace is understood. Centralizing these conceptual aspects has
perhaps overshadowed more pragmatic priorities in transition periods’. While the prag-
matic concerns she addresses are the ways citizens in post-conflict states practise normal-
ity, there are other pragmatic concerns that a focus on interventionary practice
international transitional justice actors also tends to obscureAQ7
¶
, like the interests of domestic
elites. As the next section of this article goes on to argue, there is good reason to believe
that unless the aspirations for more localized, redistributive or restorative justice accord in
some way with the ideological or material interests of politically effective groups like con-
flict principals and societal elements that formally or informally contest control of the
economy with the state, it is unlikely that transitional justice actors can co-ordinate suffi-
cient political power to secure any outcome on the spectrum from liberal-legalist to
redistributionist.
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Those in the less ‘critical’, policy-oriented peacebuilding literature have long argued
that policies can only be effective if they can ascertain from a given post-conflict environ-
ment how certain proposed goals tally with the state’s resources and capacity to provide
services and the elite will to direct these resources and services towards the fulfilment of
those expectations (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2008, 17).
The fixation of transitional justice critiques with the ideological commitments and interests
of external interveners has largely served to preclude any such contemplation. As the con-
tributions to the special issue demonstrate, those liberal-legalist aspirations that transi-
tional justice actors initially promote at headquarters level are fundamentally reshaped
by domestic negotiations and then compromised by domestic political economy
factors. Revised forms of transitional justice that depart from earlier preoccupations
with civil and political rights to address socio-economic injustice and everyday concerns
must, like any more traditional conception of it, proceed from an acute awareness of
the key opportunities and limitations that condition the political economy of the state con-
cerned to understand how justice interventions can build on or manipulate these exigen-
cies. Particularly in those environments like Libya where the international community is
evidently ‘lacking any material leverage’ over national or factional leaderships (Lamont
2016, 388), the rote binary of international versus domestic may obscure a clear vision
of where much, if not most, power and influence over structural conditions really lies.
Most theories in the contemporary policy literatures of statebuilding, peacebuilding and
democratization stress the necessity of enhancing the incentives for elites to pursue pol-
icies in the public interest (e.g. Ohlson and Soderberg Kovacs 2008AQ8
¶
). For example, those
informal power structures of elite control of resources or patrimonialism that fundamen-
tally condition political behaviour and define economic expectations of politically effective
actors need to changeAQ9
¶
, but it remains difficult to do so. As Helmke and Levitsky (2004AQ10
¶
)
contend, those branches of research or policy campaigning that neglect to incorporate
these structures are apt to overlook many of the defining incentives and constraints
that govern political behaviour and delimit prospects for change. Without understanding
how such factors permeate the site of intervention, much of the transitional justice’s
fourth-generation turn towards addressing structures of poverty and inequality will
resemble sloganeering, a guide to groping in the dark.
The contested domestic politics of transitional justice
The work in this special issue constitutes a necessary advance in the transitional justice
literature in particular because it mixes this by-now standard analytical focus on the ideol-
ogy and behaviour of transitional justice actors noted above with an examination of the
agency, interests and power of national actors elevated to key positions by the vagaries
of conflict and its resolution. The most impressive exponent of this approach is Valerie
Arnould (2016, 325), who consciously departs from the dichotomized view of the relation-
ship between interveners and domestic actors that epitomizes the critical transitional
justice literature. This literature is replete with presentations of international actors enjoy-
ing largely untrammelled agency to dictate the shape of justice, truth and redress while
domestic actors are passive actors that merely respond to external imposition. For
Arnould (2016, 325), the diffusion of international transitional justice norms to the dom-
estic arena is neither unproblematic nor hegemonic, and is instead characterized by
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conflict as they encounter different justice values or political concerns and are ‘enmeshed,
influenced, co-opted and distorted’ by national interests that pre-exist intervention and
should not be understood primarily as responses to it. Justice outcomes are therefore
co-produced in ways that theories of ‘spoiling’ by elites or ‘resistance’ from grassroots
actors unduly simplify. Transitional justice is never simply a reflection of a liberal ideology’s
export, but ‘as wholly dependent on a number of dynamics not originally envisaged as
part of its normative aims, such as bargaining, negotiating, accessing capital and engaging
with local politics which are often… a site of illiberality or oppression’ (Baker and Obrado-
vić-Wochnik 2016, 292).
This reality is most apparent in the study of war-related payments in Bosnia by Jessie
Hronešová (2016). As she notes, the scale of payments to victims has been vastly out-
weighed by those to veterans, resulting in a sub-optimal distribution of resources and
opportunity in society. She makes it clear that the decision to prioritize veteran networks
over victim organizations owes predominantly to domestic factors of political economy. In
the context of an ‘ethnopolis’ where national identity outranks any other value systems as
an organizing political principle, veterans groups have been able to draw on privileges and
prestige that long predate peacebuilding to assume statebuilding roles and to form
powerful lobby groups to exert pressure on the national and cantonal political leaderships:
Powerful groups, which came out of the war and which were at the same time seen as the
main guarantors and potential spoilers of peace—the military—have monopolized the politi-
cal arena across all three ethno-national groups. The close links between the military leaders
and elites in the formal political sphere have over time created a distorted peacebuilding
dynamic where the place of victims as a group is highly limited. (Hronešová 2016, 353)
International actors are of course complicit in the international agreements that underpin
the ethno-national settlement, and the exclusion of victims has occurred in an environ-
ment where international donors (most notably the EU) have promoted democratization
and marketization at the expense of local socio-economic issues such as welfare provision,
and social safety nets are gutted. Damaging as this is, the deliberate exclusion of victims is
more the product of the domestic political economy—as Hronešová (2016, 344) notes,
‘Indeed, material reparations are often opposed by powerful actors, who resist the extrac-
tion of state resources and challenge victims’ rights’—than any deliberate choice of inter-
veners. It is hard to demonstrate that greater commitment to more thoroughgoing
reparations for victims on the part of external transitional justice actors could have
altered the domestic political calculi behind resource accumulation by post-war elites.
As Lai’s study of Bosnia makes clear, ethnic leaderships amassed economic and political
power during the war (i.e. before international intervention) and dominated a criminalized
post-war state based on connections between political leaders and economic elites.
Though she laments that the ‘liberal bias’ embedded in the transitional justice framework
‘left socioeconomic issues affecting the Bosnian society substantially unaddressed’ (Lai
2016, 374), the implication that transitional justice actors enjoyed sufﬁcient potency to
address socioeconomic issues if they refocused their attention to them is undermined
by the clear ascendancy enjoy by recalcitrant elites detailed elsewhere in her piece.
Bosnia, of course, is a state where the international community through the Office of
the High Representative and EU accession negotiations exert significant supervisory func-
tions over domestic politics. The dynamics at play in Lamont’s presentation of transitional
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justice in post-Qadhafi Libya suggest an even more limited influence enjoyed by liberal-
legalist conceptions of justice in states where there is little international leverage over
domestic politics. While Lamont is concerned to illustrate that the teleology of inter-
national transitional justice models was illegitimate in the eyes of communities within
Libya (which he does very well), one important additional implication is not fully teased
out, namely that these international conceptions of justice were entirely subordinated
to domestic visions of justice and political logic. As Lamont (2016, 383, 388) describes,
Libya experienced a highly distinctive (and noticeably non-liberal and non-secular)
emphasis on martyrs as a distinct and symbolic form of victimhood, a one-sided Transi-
tional Justice Law that offended liberal rule of law principles and saw the prioritization
of forms of administrative justice primarily oriented around the exclusion of certain individ-
uals and groups (sometimes internationally supported) from power in the post-Qadhafi
state. However, to picture this process primarily as a challenge to international legal
norms or as a ‘conflict between Islamists and an external community of professionalized
rule of law practitioners who sought to transpose Euro-centric notions and vocabularies
of democratization and justice to Libya’s transition’ (Lamont 2016, 393) is to repeat the ten-
dency of critics of liberal interventionism to foreground the West and the liberal in analysis
at the neglect of the domestic political economy. The relevant struggles over the framing of
justice in Libya were not primarily domestic versus international, but rather between differ-
ent domestic factions in a civil war in which the international community’s preferred policy
preference (ICC trials of a fewQadhafi regime remnants), are not somuch illegitimate as irre-
levant as it lacks any ability to fundamentally empower realignments in the fluctuating pol-
itical order amidst an ongoing civil war. In those areas where there is a clash, namely
between international vetting practices outlined by the UN and politically exclusionary
purges preferred by the domestic Governing National Council, the relatively shallow
resolve of interveners failed against determined local opposition (Lamont 2016, 395).
Arnould’s survey of DR Congo again illustrates the salience of domestic elite-level poli-
tics in determining the boundaries of justice. The possibility of international criminal
justice was initially raised by Laurent Kabila’s government in 1999 in the interests of deter-
ring actors from neighbouring states from further invasion and by his son’s self-referral to
the ICC in 2004 to use as a bargaining chip against rebel factions. Other mechanisms like a
truth commission (promoted by global civil society) and domestic civil trials (promoted by
statebuilders) did not get sufficient support from Kinshasa to make these enterprises
worthwhile, or suffered political interference when they risked implicating the govern-
ment (Arnould 2016, 327–328, 330). Commitment to ICC prosecutions has oscillated
depending on the progress of the national peace process. Though the UN was complicit
in the Congolese government’s inconsistent approach, in the clash between the national
leadership’s view of transitional justice as a retractable arm of conflict management and
the UN’s vision of it as a form of liberal statebuilding, the former approach has always
exerted the greater influence.
Two things in particular are worth noting about Arnould’s contribution and those of
Hronešová, Lai and Lamont. The first is that the models of justice promoted by the inter-
national community were either ignored or successfully instrumentalized by emerging
politico-military elites for other political purposes—to secure the hegemony of veteran
groups and war profiteers in Bosnia, to bolster the ideology of martyrdom and political
exclusion in Libya, to serve as both carrot and stick in DR Congo’s internal securitization.
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This reality calls into question the notion that the parameters for transitional justice and
peacebuilding are predominantly or entirely ‘defined’ by the international community
(Lai 2016, 363). The second thing worth noting follows naturally from the first—that
where liberal-legalist impulses were subordinated to endogenous policy formation over
justice, what emerged was not a commitment to socio-economic justice, social services,
redistribution of wealth or a revision of unequal structures. This is important because
the contemporary critique of transitional justice consistently implies that if the liberal-leg-
alist lens was removed, greater space would emerge for more redistributive, welfarist or
egalitarian approaches to arise organically (Turner 2013, 206; Dancy and Wiebelhaus-
Brahm 2015, 58). This argument is essentially correct—transitional justice practice has gen-
erally ignored socio-economic injustice—but this only tells half the story. The limitations
and structured invisibilities of transitional justice are as much the product of post-conflict
political economy as they are of international liberal hubris. As O’Reilly (2016, 433) puts it,
‘maldistribution is produced through the boundaries of political community, which work
to exclude particular groups and individuals from being entitled to make claims for just
distribution’. The above examples illustrate that domestic actors are often willing to
aggressively regulate those boundaries through endogenous iterations of transitional
justice in exclusionary fashion that significantly depart from exogenous blueprints.
Towards a new research agenda
As the contributions to the special issue suggest, greater attention to the nexus of peace-
building and transitional justice must compel attention to transitional justice as it really is
on the ground. It means eschewing the discourse of technical legalism that obfuscates the
underlying politics of its interventions (Sharp 2013, 150). It means rejecting a policy-
oriented research agenda which fits with a pro-market liberal peacebuilding model that
disavows more radical structural analysis of conflict or more egalitarian means of organiz-
ing society (Franzki and Olarte 2013, 201, 202). It means destabilizing traditional con-
ceptions of transitional justice and challenging its existing modi operandi to reveal
concealed interests, ideological limitations and repetition of historical patterns of class
domination obscured by its rhetoric. However, greater attention to the nexus of peace-
building and transitional justice also means treating domestic politics as more than
mere constraints on prefabricated liberal-legalist justice. Instead, as this special issue illus-
trates, what we see is a dyadic relationship between domestic and international actors
based on a mix of conflictual and co-operative strategies which explain why grand
designs for socio-economically transformative iterations of justice must give way to the
types of bargaining and compromise that often leave pre-war societal structures largely
untouched. Because of the absence of centralization and bureaucratic reach beyond the
metropolis, ‘the post-civil war state frequently lacks the capacity to translate its decisions
into authoritative rules applicable to society as a whole… It therefore often has little
option but to negotiate with powerful class and identity group leaders to achieve
system goals’ (Rothchild 2002, 120). While domestic political leaders may wish to avail
themselves of the material and symbolic benefits of transitional justice or use it to
exclude other groups in society, they are likely to resist broader conceptions of justice
because they fear these might undermine their security, power or economic interests.
Transitional justice actors lack social or political power to veto the actions of domestic
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actors, draft laws or constitutions or to bypass governments to enforce proposed
measures. They operate under time, resource and commitment constraints. As a result,
they are completely dependent on the co-operation or lack of obstruction from national
and sub-national stakeholders if the projects they promote are to be realized effectively.
Consequently, if transitional justice actors or peacebuilders aspire to secure some or all
of their goals and if domestic elites simultaneously aspire to preserve some or all or
their objectives, they must bargain over the type of justice they wish to secure.
Of course, the discourse of transitional justice has long been seen by critics as empow-
ering elites at the expense of the most disempowered in society, and as diverting attention
from the beneficiaries of the existing social system (Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008, 367). The
question this literature has not grappled with, however, is whether forms of justice can
attain any efficacy in the absence of support from those ‘privileged local voices’ that dom-
inate policy-making debates (Hronešová 2016, 340). This is important because even those
transitional justice scholars favourably disposed to more transformative conceptions of the
field have acknowledged that while a strong case has been made for integrating socio-
economic rights within the transitional justice framework, there is little analysis of the
ways and means of putting it into practice (Haldemann and Kouassi 2014AQ11
¶
, 504). The
field has yet to develop non-ideal theories of justice that incorporate the most pervasive
barriers to change in those ‘burdened societies’ that lack the political and cultural tra-
ditions, human capital or material resources to establish just institutions (Fuller 2012,
372) or explain ‘why the societal actors that supported physical violence to secure econ-
omic interests would now subscribe to a societal consensus that puts their profits in
danger’ (Franzki and Olarte 2013, 211). Bottom-up and everyday conceptions of justice
are commonly posited as an alternative to top-down, state-driven transitional justice
(e.g. Balint, Evans, and McMillan 2014). The Women’s Court for the Former Yugoslavia is
exemplary in terms of localization, sensitivity, non-coerciveness, flexibility and indepen-
dence from government. However, as O’Reilly (2016, 421, 435–436) notes, its focus on
the micro-level means it has little ‘trickle-up’ potential to achieve transformative
change to those cultures of (male) veteran dominance and war economy endurance
sketched elsewhere in the special issue.
As a response to these dilemmas (and the self-referential debates in both fields of
inquiry), the significance of this special issue lies in the way it critically highlights and
then actively bridges the gap between the transitional justice and peacebuilding literatures.
In so doing, it advances a holistic understanding of the potential convergences and diver-
gences betweenmore expansive forms of transitional justice and the realities of contempor-
ary peacebuilding. This is a necessary first step in explaining why ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ as
formulated at headquarters level by international peacebuilders and donors seldom take
this form on the ground, but one which scholars in the field have either not recognized
or consciously ignored. In highlighting how official bodies supported by the international
community are inaccessible and often undesired in Sierra Leone (Martin 2016), how
gender justice was marginalized in Bosnia-Herzegovina (O’Reilly 2016) and how state-
centric transitional justice in Libya essentially revolved around weak institutions that
lacked popular legitimacy (Lamont 2016), the contributions demonstrate the ways in
which the interpretative frames attached to peace and justice condition the positions of
international actors on transitional justice practice in unhelpful ways. It is clear that inter-
national actors engaged in peacebuilding promote institutions and foster forms of
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governance that are unconducive tomeaningful transitional justice. In response, the special
issue consciously foregrounds how local actors and everyday practices for addressing the
past can serve as a source of justice. However, the contributions also break new ground
in recognizing the dangers of viewing all resistance to transitional justice purely as a rejec-
tion of ‘our’ liberal norms, concluding instead that local resistance to projects advanced by
INGOs and experts might better be understood as attempts to advance alternative political
orders. The contributions illustrate that many of the barriers to justice lie in endogenous
debates over itsmeaning, scope andbeneficiaries. As such, it highlights the risks of asserting
that the international community ‘creates’, ‘mandates’ or ‘imposes’ certain visions of
justice—the practice revealed in these contributions reveals amuchmoremediated, impro-
vised and altered series of interactions. The editors of the special issue correctly conclude
that the forms of politics that emerge from peacebuilding and transitional justice ‘inadver-
tently privilege those with social, political or economic capital—that is, those who are able
to navigate its structures and hierarchies by playing the correct game’ (Obradovic-Wochnik
2016AQ12
¶
, 295). What the articles herein make clear, and what the transitional justice literature
they build on hitherto have not, is that there are distinct impediments to altering the
rules of this game which lie as much in the domestic politics of contestation as they do in
the rationalities and pathologies of liberal interventionism.
Transitional justice has developed along specific lines and has privileged certain mean-
ings and goals over others not only the basis of the exogenous ideologies of interveners,
but also on account of the parameters established endogenously by ascendant post-con-
flict elites and prevailing social mores that benefit those with political or military power
(Islamists in Libya, veterans in Bosnia) more than those that do not (women, rural commu-
nities, the urban poor). Millar and Lecy (2016, 316) are correct in arguing that transitional
justice actors have hitherto failed to interrogate the ontological, epistemological and
methodological biases of the field and the ways this has obscured a proper understanding
of the problems facing post-conflict societies and solutions thereto. However, it is not
enough to interrogate external conceptions of those problems and the limits of liberal pro-
jects as responses if we accept that external normative frameworks become fundamentally
modified, co-opted or ‘bent’ at first contact with the relevant domestic interlocutors. The
adequate conceptualization of harms and design of appropriate measures for rendering
the more meaningful justice that O’Reilly (2016, 422) demands are a necessary condition
of a more holistic, sensitive and emancipatory transitional justice, but will remain insuffi-
cient in the absence of political will on the part of domestic actors. The extent to which
emerging theories of transitional justice do and do not grapple with the incentives
created and paths closed off by elite power and wealth retention suggests the limits of
the field’s utility for catalysing emancipatory change.
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